Newsweek
In recent months, conservative economists and editorialists have
tried to pin the blame for the unholy international financial mess on subprime lending
and subprime borrowers. If bureaucrats and social activists hadn't
pressured firms to lend to the working poor, the narrative goes, we'd
still be partying like it was 2005 and Bear Stearns would be a going
concern. The Wall Street Journal's editorial page has repeatedly heaped
blame on the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), the 1977 law aimed at
preventing redlining in minority neighborhoods. Fox Business Network
anchor Neil Cavuto in September proclaimed that "loaning to minorities
and risky folks is a disaster."
This line of
reasoning is absurd on several levels. Many of the biggest subprime
lenders weren't banks, and thus weren't covered by the CRA. Nobody
forced Bear Stearns to borrow $33 for every dollar of assets it had,
and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac didn't coerce highly compensated CEOs
into rolling out no-money-down, exploding adjustable-rate mortgages.
Banks will lose just as much money lending to really rich white guys
like former Lehman Brothers CEO Richard Fuld as they will on loans to
poor people of color in the South Bronx.
But the best refutation may be provided by Douglas Bystry, president and CEO of Clearinghouse CDFI (community development financial institution), based in Lake Forest, Calif.
Since 2003, this for-profit firm in Orange County—home to busted
subprime behemoths like Ameriquest—has made $220 million in mortgages
in the Golden State's subprime killing fields. More than 90 percent of
its home loans have gone to first-time buyers, about half of whom are
minorities. Out of 770 single-family loans it has made, how many
foreclosures have there been? "As far as we know," says Bystry,
"seven." Last year Clearinghouse reported a $1.4 million pretax profit.
Community-development
banks, credit unions and other CDFIs—a mixture of faith-based and
secular, for-profit and not-for-profit organizations—constitute what
might be called the "ethical subprime lending" industry. Even amid the
worst housing crisis since the 1930s, many of these institutions sport
healthy payback rates. They haven't bankrupted their customers or their
shareholders. Nor have they rushed to Washington begging for bailouts.
Their numbers include tiny startups and veterans like Chicago's
ShoreBank, founded in 1973, which now sports $2.3 billion in assets,
418 employees and branches in Detroit and Cleveland.
Cliff Rosenthal, CEO of the National Federation of Community
Development Credit Unions, notes that for his organization's 200
members, which serve predominantly low-income communities, "delinquent
loans are about 3.1 percent of assets." In the second quarter, by
contrast, the national delinquency rate on subprime loans was 18.7
percent.
Participants in this "opportunity finance"
field, as it is called, aren't a bunch of squishy social workers. In
order to keep their doors open, they have to charge appropriate
rates—slightly higher than those on prime, conforming loans—and manage
risk properly. They judge their results on financial performance and on
the impact they have on the communities they serve. "We have to be
profitable, just not profit-maximizing," says Mark Pinsky, president
and CEO of the Opportunity Finance Network, an umbrella group for CDFIs
that in 2007 collectively lent $2.1 billion, with charge-offs of less
than 0.75 percent.
What sets the "good" subprime
lenders apart is that they never bought into all the perverse
incentives and "innovations" of the late subprime lending system—the
fees paid to mortgage brokers, fancy offices and the reliance on
securitization. Like a bunch of present-day George Baileys, ethical
subprime lenders evaluate applications carefully, don't pay brokers big
fees to rope customers into high-interest loans and mostly hold onto
the loans they make rather than reselling them. They focus less on
quantity than on quality. Clearinghouse's borrowers must qualify for
the fixed-rate mortgages they take out. "If one of our employees pushed
someone into a house they couldn't afford, they would be fired," says
CEO Bystry.
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